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Review Nina Baym 
What Was Literature? Class Culture and Mass 
Society. Leslie Fiedler. New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1982. Pp. 258. 
In What Was Literature?, Leslie Fiedler collects and connects some 
nineteen lecture-essays that he has long been delivering around the 
country (I heard one of them at least a decade ago). They are arranged 
in two parts: the first, entitled "Subverting the Standards," proclaims the 
death of literary study as we have practiced it in American colleges and 
universities; the second, "Opening Up the Canon," purports to sketch 
a new 
approach that may revive it. The essays in the first part have such 
coy titles as "Who Was Leslie A. Fiedler?" "What Was the Novel?" 
(a matter that is dispatched in four printed pages) "Why Was Criti 
cism?" They are often repetitious, and just as often they contradict one 
another. The second part outlines a history of a new Amrican epic?or 
rather, a newly discovered American epic?which Fiedler constructs 
from a choice of popular novels. 
There is, however, little novelty in the book?and novelty, alas, is 
what this shtik (to borrow his borrowed word) is all about. Over the years 
Fiedler has made his notions familiar to us all; and it turns out that in 
printed form, where they are available for scrutiny and reflection be 
yond the momentary impact of a dynamic lecture presentation?the 
"show biz" on which he thrives?they disclose only cosmetic changes 
from the thesis of Love and Death in the American Novel. Fiedler's persona, 
notwithstanding his apologia for comic books and TV cop shows, is still 
an arriviste trying to embarrass the New England literary establishment, 
still an elitist terrified and suspicious of what he simplistically totalizes 
as "the popular mind," still a misogynist, still an advocate of literary 
violence and rape, still a puritanical (or rabbinical) celebrant of the 
Dionysian: that is, one who celebrates dionysic impulses if and only if 
they are acknowledged as evil and shameful. The pop culture that he 
describes as "ours" is the long since defunct college-student dropout 
commune culture of the late 1960s, which even in its heyday was a 
minority (and perhaps elitist) concern. Despite a great deal of huffery 
and puffery in these essays about his growth and development, I find 
little change, no expansion, and above all no self-scrutiny or self-correc 
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tion, in his work over the last twenty years. Boastfully claiming not to 
read or acknowledge any "criticism" (a word that usually appears 
within quotation marks) on the matters he writes about, he is still always 
ready to attack what he alleges critics to have said or not said (though 
how he found out is a mystery) about the works he discusses and the 
academic and cultural trends he describes?a move that guarantees him 
an outsider status not because he is provocative (as he likes to believe), 
or ungenerous (literary criticism is not notable for generosity), but 
because he is talking at people rather than with them. 
In fact the true and only subject of Fiedler's book is himself, this 
particular critic as hero. It is he, all by himself, who is "subverting the 
standards" and 
"opening up the canon." (Never mind, among others, 
feminist critics, who have called attention to dozens of excellent ne 
glected women writers; or the deconstructionists who have reversed the 
ways in which literature is read and thus in the most literal way 
"subverted" standards even if retaining the canon.) "But on this subject, 
too, critics were once again silent, except, of course, for me" (p. 44); 
"I announced boldly (as I announce every new insight boldly)" (p. 73). 
Me, me: "what I yearned for was to be published ... to open communi 
cation with an audience, to exist for others" (p. 23). The yearning to 
exist for others seems simply to have overridden the existence of those 
others for the Fiedler persona, who is still at the mirror stage, seeing his 
own image in all that he gazes on so that his work seems finally of 
minimal value as either account or critique. The "cryptoanalytic 
" 
crit 
ic?one adjective which Fiedler uses to describe his work?must be 
sensitive to the potential otherness of the text if he is to decipher its 
codes, as must the "contextual" critic?another of his adjectives?to the 
cultural and historical scene. But Fiedler is sensitive only to his own 
mental processes, and to his own reception. 
In Love and Death in the American Novel, as readers will recall (for we 
certainly all did read that book, and it had an exhilarating effect in a 
context of stuffy moralistic criticism), Fiedler argued that our best 
literature conveyed a myth of America which featured and idealized a 
sublimated interracial male homoerotic bonding in the wilderness, deni 
grated the male-female relationships of settled society, and presented the 
crudest male adolescent stereotypes as excuses for female characteriza 
tion. The thesis was notable for having its cake and eating it too: while 
attacking our best writers for their immaturity, it never queried their 
status as the best. It participated, none too subtly, in the ferocious 
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misogyny which it uncovered (I think in many cases accurately) in 
these books, and thus made a mockery of its apparent claim to mark a 
new 
stage in the maturing of the America (male) psyche. The book did 
not ask whether its chosen works really were "the best" and if so, why, 
let alone whether "the best" could ever be more than an opinion. Fiedler 
assumed, like Parrington, Trilling, and a host of others, that literary 
value in American books was a function of what they told "us" about 
our nation. He knew as well as other critics what being American was 
really all about. He posited a collective but historical unconscious (one 
which, despite his claim to a residual Marxism, is neither economic or 
ideological in nature) which expressed, repeatedly, the same national 
psyche in its best literature?and if a book lacked the myth, then it 
wasn't among the best. 
In brief, from a theoretical standpoint, Love and Death in the American 
Novel was vulnerable in the extreme. Luckily, theory was not so well 
developed back then and this weakness passed largely, though not entire 
ly, unnoticed. But Fiedler's view of the critic as a provocateur also 
demanded that he not consider the ways in which his argument might 
be strengthened or weakened by such empirical and logical matters as 
the laws of evidence, documentation, or argument. He simply asserted 
that things were as he said they were, with little attention to what he 
now 
slightingly calls 
" 
4rigor' of exposition and accuracy of citation" 
(p. 109?the single quotes enclosing the word 'rigor' are his). Thus he 
could not compensate for theoretical defects with a strong or sophisticat 
ed historical empiricism. In fact the book was full of errors (as is What 
Was Literature?) significant enough to put into question the issue of 
whether or not Fiedler knew what he was talking about. (In What Was 
Literature? [p. 148] he asserts that in the earlier book he returned to Susan 
Warner's The Wide, Wide World "over and over again" but in fact there 
is a total of two passing references to the novel, one of which gets the 
heroine's name wrong, and a third to the author?leading me to suspect 
that Fiedler hadn't then, and hasn't still, read the novel.) But the book's 
tremendous success as evidenced in citations, responses, and dissertation 
production, constituted, for a while incontrovertible evidence of his 
expertise. 
In What Was Literature? Fiedler simultaneously restates and reaffirms 
the thesis of Love and Death in the American Novel, and attempts to 
correct?more 
accurately, to conceal?its deficiencies by broadening its 
scope to include pop American literature. A great deal of rhetorical 
223 
obfuscation notwithstanding, his view of the canon, of "our 
" 
best works, 
has not changed an iota: Brockden Brown, Poe, Hawthorne, Melville 
are paraded before us once more as the only true flowers of our literature. 
Only, now, some few popular books are also allowed to march along?at 
the back of the procession, to be sure?not because they have literary 
excellence as such but because they disclose the very same myth as the 
elite works did, in a form more suited to "the popular mind." The study 
of popular literature, that is to say, only confirms the myth that Fiedler 
discovered in elite literature. And since what Fiedler has always been 
looking for is that myth?the American version of sex and violence?he 
can proclaim himself a lover of popular literature without feeling that 
he thereby damages his claim to be our leading literary critic. The cake 
is still eaten and had. 
Just as Fiedler's vision of "our best literature" remains highly selec 
tive?no Howells, no Cather, and so on?his vision of popular literature 
is similarly partial. One innovation in approach, perhaps the only one, 
is that where Love and Death accepted a canon already in existence, What 
Was Literature? creates one?thereby intensifying the incipient solipsism 
of Love and Death rather than escaping from it. In one essay he selects 
what he describes as the "four forms which have most troubled elitist 
critics even as they have most pleased the mass audience:" sentimental 
literature, horror literature, hard core pornography (including Sade and 
Pauline Reage), and low comedy (Lenny Bruce and others) [p. 133]. He 
would probably consider it overly 'rigorous' in the reviewer to point out 
that the Marquis de Sade, while never a great favorite of "the mass 
audience," has certainly been the topic of a great deal of serious, "elitist" 
literary criticism. Or that Lenny Bruce never had a tremendous follow 
ing. Or to suggest that a definition of popular literature which includes, 
a priori, dismissal by elitist critics (whoever they are) begs the demon 
stration that a split between "low" and "high" is the essence of the 
literary scene today. Or to note that what Fiedler defines as popular 
literature is what he likes, and that since he is not a member of "the mass 
audience" this cannot be an acceptable criterion. 
In the series of essays which constitute Part II of What Was Literature?, 
Fiedler outlines "a hitherto unperceived 'epic,' embodying a myth of 
our history unequaled in scope and resonance by any work of High Art" 
(p. 154). This work of the collective unconscious includes Uncle Tom's 
Cabin, The Clansman, Gone With the Wind, and Roots, all of which are read 
as the darker brother of the elite books, dipping frankly into the matters 
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of miscegenation and rape that the elite books avoided, though every 
where implied, through their sublimated homoeroticism. This is what 
"the American imagination" is all about, Fiedler claims, and the virtue 
of the popular book is that it makes it ever so much clearer than the 
more clever elite one. This is because the writer to a mass audience is, 
either really or affectedly, much more naive than the elite writer?a 
self-serving and elitist assumption if ever there was one. In fact, if the 
book at hand does not reveal that myth, then?no matter how many have 
claimed to read it or love it?it is not "echt popular literature" (p. 122). 
And if readers are on record as experiencing the book in a different 
fashion from that which Fiedler attributes to them?well, they're a mass 
audience, which can't be expected to know why it likes what it likes. 
It is, of course, illogical to object to the use of a normative definition 
for 
"good" literature, although one can certainly quarrel with one or 
another particular criterion for asserting that a given book is "really" 
good. All talk about "good" literature must be evaluative, seeking to 
persuade others to accept its criteria as well as the specific judgments 
those criteria imply. Similarly, arguments that academics and serious 
critics "should" pay more attention to popular literature, or anything 
else they have overlooked, are necessarily grounded in value judgments. 
But the field of study itself, that to which attention should be paid, it 
seems to me, needs to be established by invoking external, "objective" 
criteria. Neither the field of popular literature, nor?for that matter? 
the field of the "American," are properly constituted by a list of the 
critic's favorite works. To produce analyses of popular literature, or 
American literature, which have at the outset distinguished between the 
popular and the echt popular, or that which is merely written in America 
as 
opposed to that which is "really" American or "most American" is, 
in the crassest way, to be inventing rather than studying one's subject. 
That a field to some degree is always constituted by the questions we 
ask of it, that the status of the objective is problematical, does not cancel 
this obligation so much as make it a more difficult and subtle one to 
satisfy. The problem is not easy to set up, or the answers to come by; 
both question and answers remain subject to constant scrutiny and 
modification?oops, rigor again. Fiedler's lack of rigor, and his flaunting 
of inaccuracies, amounts to a form of coarse rhetorical bullying designed 
not 
merely to cow us into accepting his interpretations of the subject, 
but the constitution of the subject as well. In this procedure, however, 
and despite his claims to uniqueness, he is only one among many 
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Americanists, for whom tendentious definitions of the real thing have 
long been standard practice. 
One could pursue Fiedler's commentary at length to uncover its 
fixation on the middle and late 1960s; or to disclose its obsessive misogy 
ny even in?especially in?an argument which claims to be setting out 
to "redeem the feminine popular tradition" (p. 157). Thanks. But since 
Fiedler has attempted to unify his various essays through a contrast 
between 
"compulsory" literature read for work (in the classroom, under 
the aegis of elitist professors) and "optional" literature read for pleasure, 
it is perhaps more important to concentrate on his notion of the pleasures 
of artworks, whether high or low. "They provide the shameful pleasure 
we all feel... in contemplating images of terror and pain, with or 
without erotic overtones?indulging, vicariously, in the dangerous and 
the forbidden" he writes (p. 49). 
I will not play the critical prude (what Fiedler would call the critical 
virgin or spinster) and insist that shameful pleasures are never derived 
from reading novels or watching TV violence. But to make them the 
whole story is, it seems to me, both an impoverishment and a brutalizing 
of the range of pleasures that literature is capable of providing. Appar 
ently Fiedler believes that all pleasure is shameful, that no one really 
enjoys anything that is permitted, and that all claims to the contrary are 
so much hypocrisy. He is entitled to this vision of human nature, but 
it is a very specialized one, and profoundly moralistic. Indeed, Fiedler's 
suggestion of a way of reading literature that he calls "ecstatics" in 
volves asserting that "we must"?note that 'must'?"also serve God 
with the evil impulse" (p. 139), and hence integrates every aspect of 
human experience within a moral vision whose ideological basis, local, 
historical origins, and hegemonizing intentions he does not seem to see. 
Besides being, ultimately, the expression of a totalizing morality 
which makes him more like than unlike most of the critical and cultural 
phenomena he attacks, Fiedler's approach is also, as he asserts, cryptogra 
phic, reading for the exposure of secrets. (Cryptography and patriarchal 
moralism may well go together.) This approach is impatient with 
surface form, and dismisses reports submitted by real people about their 
reading pleasures. Yet if, as Fiedler also asserts, fiction is fantasy; and if, 
as we all know, life is full of loneliness, pain, and terror, why should 
literature not on occasion provide fantasies of community, security, and 
simple bliss? Why should they?we?not enjoy the cheerful and com 
forting as well as the terrible and frightening, the permitted as well as 
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the forbidden? If violent rape is a commonplace, and rapists seldom 
punished, why not a literature where it is always averted and the attempt 
always avenged? If women are oppressed and dominated, why not a 
literature where we control things? If life is mean, why not a literature 
where life is magnanimous? 
Another defect of the cryptographic approach as Fiedler practices it 
is an inability to distinguish between a real and a literary experience, 
or at least to allow the reader such ability. Enjoyment of literature may 
depend crucially on the constant awareness that it is not real. "Real" 
violence is terribly unsafe; literary violence doesn't leave a scratch on 
a person. It stands to reason that this difference is not trivial. The shame, 
terror, and guilt a person might "really" feel as an attacked or attacker 
may be exactly what reading or viewing is free of; and of course it is 
free of all real-life consequences. Dr. Johnson scoffed at the unities 
because, as he pointed out, nobody ever for a moment imagined the play 
to be taking place anywhere but in a theater. Fiedler's view assumes that 
we mistake books for real life, and thus projects a false na?vet? on readers 
and viewers who often turn to books and spectacles because they've had 
enough of life already. Thus, despite his claim to correct the Victorian 
seriousness of academic criticism, to make (p. 34) "our country and our 
culture seem more interesting and amusing than most academic ac 
counts would lead us to believe," his is a profoundly oppressive criti 
cism. 
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